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ABSTRACT
THE IMPACT OF FORECAST ROUNDNESS, FORECAST UNCERTAINTY, AND
MANAGERS’ LANGUAGE ON INVESTORS’ JUDGMENTS
MAY 2017
JESSICA LYNN OSGOOD, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor M. David Piercey
Management forecasts can have varying degrees of roundness, including sharp
(e.g., a sales growth forecast of 9.73% or 10.27%), explicitly round (e.g., 10.00%), and
rounded (e.g., 10%). Prior archival research indicates investors rely less upon round than
sharp forecasts (Bamber, Hui, and Yeung 2010), yet it is unclear why this occurs or how
contextual features of earnings forecasts moderate this effect. Moreover, this prior
research has not distinguished between the effects of explicitly round versus rounded
estimates. I provide evidence that the impact of forecast roundness on willingness to
invest depends upon forecast uncertainty. That is, rounded sales forecasts enhance
management credibility and make investors more willing to invest, but only when the
level of forecast uncertainty is higher. Furthermore I find that investors react to explicitly
round and rounded forecasts differently (i.e., 10.00% versus 10%), with explicitly round
forecasts leading to higher willingness to invest when uncertainty is lower versus when
uncertainty is higher similar to rounded forecasts. I also examine and find that managers
can alter their language to repair credibility concerns resulting from a mismatch between
forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty. Overall, my results show how a change as
seemingly innocuous as rounding a sales forecast can alter investors’ perceptions of
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management credibility and their willingness to invest. For example, my findings suggest
conditions in which companies using a sharp underlying sales forecast to meet an
earnings target can improve investors’ perceptions by simply rounding the sales forecast
disclosed while keeping the underlying number sharp. To the extent that investors react
negatively to a mismatch between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty, my results
provide information to financial managers about how to carefully construct earnings
forecasts to limit these negative reactions.

Keywords: management forecast; forecast roundness; forecast uncertainty; language;
verbal immediacy
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Managers issue voluntary earnings forecasts to help align investors’ expectations
with their own (Ajinkya and Gift 1984). However, given that managers can benefit from
optimistically biasing their forecast, the extent to which investors rely on managements’
forecast depends upon how credible they perceive the forecast to be (Hutton, Miller, and
Skinner 2003; Jennings 1987; Mercer 2004; Ng, Tuna, and Verdi 2013). In this study, I
investigate how one detailed characteristic of managers’ forecast, forecast roundness,
interacts with a characteristic of the forecast environment, forecast uncertainty, to jointly
influence investors’ perceptions of management credibility and their willingness to invest
in a company.
It is important to investigate these questions for several reasons. First, although
prior studies have examined round and sharp forecasts, they do not distinguish between
round and explicitly round forecasts. A widely accepted definition of roundness indicates
that round numbers have trailing zeros, while sharp numbers do not (Dehaene and Mehler
1992; Dehaene 1997). However, this definition is silent with regard to whether trailing
zeros after (versus before) the decimal point still increase roundness. Hereafter I refer to
numbers with trailing zeros after the decimal place as explicitly round numbers (e.g.,
10.00%). Neither prior research in psychology nor accounting has examined explicitly
round numbers. Extant accounting research focuses on EPS forecasts, which necessarily
always include two decimal places. However, because other forecasts, such as percentage
growth forecasts, do not have a standard number of decimal places, it is important to
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investigate how trailing zeros after (as opposed to before) the decimal place influence
investor judgments.
In addition, existing research in psychology and accounting typically finds that
round numbers are inferior to sharp numbers. For example, investors rely less upon
rounder forecasts (Dechow and You 2012; Bamber et al. 2010), and consumers rely less
on rounder advertising claims (Xie and Kronrod 2012). I extend this research by using
psychology theory to predict that investors’ preference for roundness can reverse
depending on forecast uncertainty. That is, forecasts are inherently uncertain, but to the
extent that a forecast is more or less uncertain investors’ preference for roundness may
reverse. Rounder (sharp) forecasts, which imply intuitive estimation (calculation), are
more plausible given higher (lower) forecast uncertainty. Thus, I predict investment
willingness depends on the match between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty. I
expect that under lower forecast uncertainty investors are more willing to invest when the
forecast is sharp (vs. rounded) but under higher forecast uncertainty they are more willing
to invest when the forecast is rounded (vs. sharp).
Finally, since I predict that investment willingness is relatively lower for sharp
(round) forecasts under higher (lower) forecast uncertainty, I also investigate a linguistic
strategy managers can use to repair this relatively lower investment willingness.
Specifically, certain linguistic components collectively known as verbal immediacy are
associated with more truthful messages. Because of this association I examine whether
managers can increase their verbal immediacy to increase credibility and repair reduced
investment willingness predicted in the above conditions.
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I conduct a 4 x 2 x 2 between-participants experiment, with MBA students in the
role of investors (Elliott et al. 2007). I manipulate forecast roundness at four levels, by
varying whether management’s sales growth forecast is 9.73%, 10.27% (i.e., a lower or
higher sharp number, centered at 10.00%), 10.00% (an explicitly round number), or 10%
(a rounded number). Since I am interested in whether roundness versus sharpness in-andof itself (as opposed to very minor differences in magnitude) influences investors’
judgments, I manipulate sharpness via two conditions centered at 10.00%, one higher
(10.27%) and one lower (9.73%) than the round forecast. This enables me to hold the
average sales growth forecast constant and to infer whether results are in fact driven by
roundness versus sharpness as opposed to magnitude. I also manipulate uncertainty
surrounding the sales forecast at two levels: higher and lower. When forecast uncertainty
is lower the sales forecast for the new model is based on prior models with substantial
historical sales growth information. When forecast uncertainty is higher the sales forecast
is for a brand new product with no prior models to base the forecast upon. Finally, I
manipulate managers’ language using multiple components that have been shown
through factor analysis to represent the same construct, known as verbal immediacy (e.g.,
Pennebaker and King 1999). In the less immediate language, condition the CEO does not
use any first person singular pronouns (e.g., “I”) or discrepancy words (e.g., “should”)
but uses more articles (e.g., “the”) and the passive voice. In the more immediate language
condition, the CEO uses more first person singular pronouns, and discrepancy words, as
well as fewer articles and the active voice.
Results indicate that investment willingness depends upon the match between
forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty, and that credibility assessments mediate this
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effect. Specifically, investors are more willing to invest when the forecast is sharp (e.g.,
9.73% and 10.27%), versus rounded (e.g., 10%), in an environment of lower uncertainty,
but more willing to invest when the forecast is rounded (e.g., 10%) in an environment of
higher uncertainty. Furthermore, when examining explicitly round sales forecasts (e.g.,
10.00%), I find that investors’ willingness to invest is higher under lower (versus higher)
forecast uncertainty, opposite from those with rounded sales forecasts (e.g., 10%) but also
different from those with sharp forecasts. Finally, I find that managers can eliminate the
detrimental effects of a mismatch between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty for
rounded forecasts (e.g., 10%) by changing the language they use in explaining the
forecast (i.e., increasing their verbal immediacy).
My study provides several contributions. I identify numerical roundness as a
characteristic of managers’ forecasts that can affect investors’ credibility assessments and
ultimately their willingness to invest. Traditionally, accounting and auditing standards
have viewed rounding as a relatively innocuous choice of the reporting company. My
study shows that merely rounding 9.73%, 10.27%, or even 10.00% to 10% potentially
reverses investors’ perceptions of management credibility and their willingness to invest,
depending on the level of forecast uncertainty. For example, my findings suggest
conditions in which companies using a sharp underlying sales forecast (e.g., 9.73% or
10.27%) to calculate their EPS projections can improve investors’ perceptions. That is,
by rounding the sharp sales forecast and using the rounded number in the earnings
disclosure (i.e., to 10%) while keeping the sharp underlying sales forecast used to
calculate EPS the same. Moreover, my findings suggest other conditions in which
companies rounding their sharp forecasts may unnecessarily harm themselves in the eyes
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of investors. For example, rounding the sales forecast presented in the earnings disclosure
can lead to lower perceptions of credibility and lower investment willingness when
forecast uncertainty is lower. To the extent that companies make these rounding decisions
strategically, investors, standard setters, researchers, and other stakeholders should be
aware of these effects as well.
I contribute to the small but growing accounting literature on forecast roundness
(e.g., Dechow and You 2012; Bamber et al. 2010) by identifying forecast uncertainty as a
moderator of the effects of roundness on investors’ judgments, and by demonstrating
investors’ perceptions of management credibility mediate this effect. I also distinguish
explicitly round (e.g., 10.00%), from rounded (e.g., 10%), numbers and demonstrate how
the two disclosure formats create systematically different effects on investors’ judgments.
That is, investors find round (explicitly round) forecasts more credible under higher
(lower) forecast uncertainty leading to higher investment willingness. Thus simply
rounding from 10.00% to 10% can reverse investors’ reactions to the forecast depending
on forecast uncertainty.
These findings are relevant to accounting literature that examines investors’
reactions to managers’ voluntary disclosures. While this research has examined
aggregation vs. disaggregation (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman 2007; Elliott,
Hobson, and Jackson 2011) and point vs. range forecasts (e.g., Han and Tan 2010;
Rennekamp 2017), I examine how variation within point forecasts can influence
investors’ perceptions of those forecasts. These findings also contribute to existing
psychology and consumer marketing research, which has examined roundness in many
contexts such as negotiations and advertising, and typically finds that round numbers are
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inferior to sharp numbers (e.g., Mason et al. 2013; Xie and Kronrod 2012). I identify
environmental uncertainty as a moderator of the roundness effect and find that under
higher environmental uncertainty round numbers are in fact superior to sharp numbers. In
addition, prior literature defines roundness according to the number of trailing zeros
(Dehaene and Mehler 1992; Dehaene 1997), without reference to the role of decimal
places. I examine and find that perceptions of numbers with trailing zeros after (as
opposed to before) the decimal point differ significantly and depend upon environmental
uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews related
literature and develops hypotheses, Section III presents the method, Section IV presents
my results and Section V concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Round Versus Sharp Numbers
A small archival accounting literature provides initial evidence that forecast
roundness influences investors’ reactions to earnings forecasts. Dechow and You (2012)
compare analysts’ “nickel and dime” earnings-per-share forecasts (i.e., those ending in
increments of $0.05 or $0.10) to their more sharp forecasts, and find that investors react
less to analysts’ round forecasts. Similarly, Bamber et al. (2010) find that investors react
less to managers’ round forecasts than their sharp forecasts, but only when the forecast
conveys good news. In general, these studies indicate that investors will be less willing to
invest when managers provide round (versus sharp) forecasts.
A larger body of research on number roundness comes from psychology and
marketing (e.g., consumer goods pricing). This literature defines a number’s roundness
according to the number of trailing zeros a number has – the more trailing zeros, the more
round the number (Dehaene and Mehler 1992). In addition, numbers have some degree of
roundness when they are multiples of 10, 5, 2.5 and 2 (Jansen and Pollman 2001), with
multiples of 10 representing the most round numbers. At the other end of the roundness
spectrum are non-round, or “sharp” numbers (Dehaene 1997, p. 108), which do not have
any trailing zeros nor are they multiples of any of the aforementioned factors. Intuitively,
it makes sense that numbers such as 100 or $3.00 are more round than sharp numbers
such as 91 or $2.87.
Consistent with findings from accounting, psychology and marketing studies find
round numbers are perceived to be less precise (Zhang and Schwarz 2012), less accurate
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(Schindler and Yalch 2006), less informative (Mason et al. 2013), less scientific (Xie and
Kronrod 2012), and less plausible (Loschelder et al. 2014) than sharp numbers. In
addition, this research indicates that perceptions of numerical roundness can influence a
wide variety of behaviors. For example, negotiators make larger adjustments away from
high first-offers that are round (vs. sharp) because negotiators perceive round first offers
as less plausible (Loschelder et al. 2014). Likewise, consumers low in advertising
skepticism perceive advertisers using round (vs. sharp) numbers as less competent
because participants view round numbers as less informed (Xie and Kronrod 2012). This
research suggests that roundness is an important forecast characteristic to consider, as it
may influence investors’ perceptions of forecast credibility.
2.2 Forecast Roundness and Forecast Uncertainty
While prior accounting literature suggests that investors generally tend to distrust
round forecasts (Dechow and You 2012; Bamber et al. 2010), I expect that investors’
reactions to management forecasts will differ depending on the amount of environmental
uncertainty surrounding the forecast. Prior research indicates that forecast uncertainty is
an important determinant of investors’ judgments in forecast settings. For example,
Cheng, Luo, and Yue (2013) suggest that investors are doubtful of managers’ forecasts
when those forecasts provide more or less information than investors’ believe managers
have. Similarly, Rupar (2017) examines the effects of forecast uncertainty on investors’
judgments, finding that when forecast uncertainty is lower, investors are more likely to
expect management to provide a single earnings forecast and when forecast uncertainty is
higher, investors expect management to provide a range of possible earnings per share
estimates.
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Research on conversational norms provides evidence for why this may occur,
suggesting that message recipients expect senders to provide as much information as they
can, not more, and not less (Grice 1975; Horn 1984; Huang 2007). In the domain of
financial forecasts, individuals likely prefer assessments that are just as precise as the
available information warrants, but no more precise (Du et al. 2011). Applied to the
setting of this study, recall that sharp numbers are perceived to be more informative than
round numbers (Mason et al. 2013). Thus, sharp forecasts may seem too informative
under higher forecasting uncertainty, suggesting managers are attempting to mislead
investors’ by portraying a more confident outlook than is warranted. In contrast, an
appropriately round forecast in an uncertain forecasting environment may actually appear
more credible to investors.
Alternatively, round numbers, which seem less informative (Mason et al. 2013),
may provide too little information when forecast uncertainty is lower, thereby suggesting
that managers are purposely being vague to conceal news. For example, in a more certain
forecast environment, management’s selection of an inappropriately round sales growth
forecast may appear less credible to investors, as it could indicate an opportunistically
motivated selection of that number to portray sales growth in a more positive light. In
short, when forecast roundness does not match the level of forecast uncertainty, investors
will doubt the credibility of managers’ forecast.
Overall then, I expect that investors will assess whether managers have provided a
forecast that matches the perceived level of information or calculation that is possible
given forecast uncertainty and will be more willing to invest when forecast roundness
matches the level of forecast uncertainty due to higher perceptions of forecast credibility.
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Since lower forecast uncertainty implies that managers can calculate a more exact
forecast, investors’ will be more willing to invest when managers’ provide a sharp (vs.
round) forecast. Alternatively, since higher forecast uncertainty implies that managers’
lack the information necessary to calculate a specific forecast, investors’ will be more
willing to invest when managers’ provide a round (vs. sharp) forecast. This relationship is
depicted in Figure 1. Formally stated:
H1: When forecast uncertainty is lower, investors will be more willing to invest
when managers provide more sharp (vs. more round) forecasts, but when
forecast uncertainty is higher, investors are more willing to invest when
managers provide more round (vs. more sharp) forecasts.
2.3 Rounded Versus Explicitly Round Numbers
Recall that roundness is defined in terms of trailing zeros - the more trailing zeros
a number has, the more round it is (Dehaene and Mehler 1992; Dehaene 1997). In general
prior research finds that round numbers imply intuitive estimation whereas sharp
numbers imply precision and calculation. However, this research has not examined
explicitly round numbers, which have some inherently different properties from rounded
numbers that potentially affect their implications. Explicitly round numbers are numbers
with trailing zeros after the decimal place (e.g., 10.00%). Unlike a rounded forecast (e.g.,
10%), an explicitly round forecast such as 10.00% is precise in its roundness, and based
on prior literature, it is unclear how investors will react to it compared to a rounded
number, such as 10%. Existing roundness literature indicates that numbers with more
trailing zeros are perceived as more round and therefore more strongly imply they were
derived via intuitive estimation (Janiszewski and Dimofte 2013). This suggests that
regardless of whether trailing zeros are before or after the decimal place, more zeros will
more strongly imply that the forecast was derived via intuitive estimation.
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On the other hand, by using additional decimal places in 10.00% (as opposed to 10%),
management is being precise it its disclosure of their forecast, which may signal
management’s confidence in, and the appropriateness of, their round estimate. That is,
trailing zeros after the decimal imply precision and confidence instead of intuitive
estimation. Therefore, ex ante it is unclear how investors will react to explicitly round
numbers, as intuitive estimates (more similar to rounded numbers) or as precise and
confident disclosures (more similar to sharp numbers).
2.3.1 Vagueness versus Ambiguity
One way of characterizing the difference between explicitly round (e.g., 10.00%)
and rounded (e.g., 10%) numbers is by a distinction made in psychology research
between vagueness and ambiguity, which potentially influence individual decision
makers differently. A vague term (e.g., reasonably possible) has a variety of possible
meanings but has no single, distinctly clear meaning, while an ambiguous term (e.g.,
club) has multiple clear, distinct meanings (e.g., Du and Budescu 2005; Budescu, Kuhn,
Kramer and Johnson 2002; Budescu and Wallsten 1995).
Applied to my setting, a sharp forecast (e.g., 9.73% or 10.27%) is neither vague
nor ambiguous. In contrast, a rounded forecast (e.g., 10%) can be either ambiguous or
vague. It is ambiguous in the sense that it could represent either a sharp forecast rounded
to 10% (e.g., 9.73% and 10.27% both round to 10%) or an explicitly round forecast that
has been rounded (e.g., 10.00% also rounds to 10%). Round and sharp forecasts have
distinct implications, and yet both may be represented by a rounded number like 10%. A
rounded forecast is vague, in the sense that it could represent multiple possible values in
the vicinity of 10%, denoting none more clearly than another (cf., Budescu, Karelitz and
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Wallsten 2003). That is, management may mean to convey that they do not have any one
specific value in mind, but rather estimate that sales growth will be somewhere near 10%.
Finally, an explicitly round forecast (e.g., 10.00%) is not ambiguous in the sense that the
forecast is clearly not 9.73% or 10.27%, but it is vague in the sense that just like 10%, it
conveys a meaning that “ten” is imprecise and connected to multiple possible true values
in the general vicinity.
Recall that H1 predicts that investors react to the match between forecast
roundness and forecast uncertainty, with investors more willing to invest when a more
sharp (more round) forecast occurs in an environment of lower (higher) forecast
uncertainty. In light of the psychology literature on vagueness and ambiguity, the easiest
distinction to draw between more sharp and more round forecasts (H1) occurs in the
comparison of sharp numbers (e.g., 9.73% and 10.27%), which are neither vague nor
ambiguous, to rounded numbers (e.g., 10%) which are both vague and ambiguous. In
contrast, how investors will react to 10.00% versus 10% is unclear a priori, since 10.00%
is vague but unambiguous, and therefore possesses attributes of both imprecision and
precision. Individuals usually prefer more precise information and are generally averse to
increasingly vague and ambiguous information (e.g., Ellsberg 1961; Camerer and Weber
1992; Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Du et al. 2011). As a result, they likely treat a forecast
with both vagueness and ambiguity (e.g., 10%) as most different from a highly precise,
sharp forecast. This suggests that H1 would be most likely to hold when comparing sharp
forecasts (e.g., 9.73% or 10.27%) to rounded forecasts (e.g., 10%), rather than when
comparing explicitly round forecasts (e.g., 10.00%) to sharp forecasts.
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The question remains how will investors react to an explicitly round forecast. If
they treat it as similar to a sharp forecast, due to its explicit disclosure, this suggests that
the effects of H1 are primarily driven by a rounded sales forecasts’ ambiguous
presentation rather than by its vagueness. On the other hand, if investors treat an
explicitly round forecast (e.g., 10.00%) as similar to a rounded forecast (e.g., 10%), due
to its explicit roundness (and hence vagueness), then the effects of H1 are likely driven
by a forecasts’ vagueness than by its rounded ambiguity. Prior research in psychology,
marketing, and accounting on roundness has neither addressed nor disentangled the
effects of explicit number roundness versus roundedness (cf. Du et al. 2011; Rupar 2017;
Dechow and You 2012; Bamber et al. 2010).
Although the above discussion focuses on how investors will react to explicitly
round numbers compared to rounded and sharp numbers I am interested in the interaction
between roundness and forecast uncertainty, therefore I propose a research question
investigating the interaction between explicit roundness and forecast uncertainty as
follows:
RQ1: When managers’ provide an explicitly round forecast, will investors’
willingness to invest be higher when forecast uncertainty is higher (similar
to rounded forecasts) or higher when forecast uncertainty is lower (similar to
sharp forecasts)?
2.4 Managers’ Language
Although I argue that investors’ willingness to invest depends on whether forecast
roundness matches the level of forecast uncertainty, managers’ language may also play a
role in investors’ willingness to invest. Specifically, since language influences
perceptions of credibility, managers may be able to eliminate the adverse effects of a
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mismatch between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty by changing the language
they use in explaining the forecast.
One basic dimension of language is verbal immediacy (Wiener and Mehrabian
1968; Mehrabian 1971), which reflects behaviors that create a sense of psychological
closeness or distance between a speaker and their message (Fuller, Biros, Burgoon, and
Nunamaker 2013; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, Jay, and Twitchell 2004). For example,
using more first person singular pronouns (e.g., “I”, “me”, “my”), more discrepancy
words (e.g., “should”, “would”, “could”), and fewer articles (e.g., “a”, “the”) (Biber
1988; Pennebaker, Mehl, and Neiderhoffer 2003; Pennebaker 2001; Pennebaker and King
1999) increases verbal immediacy. In addition, using the active (vs. passive) voice
increases immediacy (Mehrabian 1972; Zhou et al. 2004), whereas omitting the agent of
a sentence altogether (e.g., the ball was hit by Jim) decreases immediacy to an extreme.
Prior research suggests that subtle linguistic features such as verbal immediacy
reflect a speaker’s thoughts and feelings (Cohn, Mehl, and Pennebaker 2004). For
example, DePaulo et al. (2003) find truth tellers use more verbal immediacy than liars,
and propose truth tellers’ increased verbal immediacy reflects a strong belief in their
message whereas liars decreased verbal immediacy reflects a desire to distance
themselves from their lies. Similarly, Hyland (2005a, 2005b) argues that increased verbal
immediacy reflects that a speaker truly believes what they are saying. Thus, managers’
language, and specifically their verbal immediacy, is likely to reflect whether they truly
believe in their forecast.
More importantly though, is that subtle linguistic cues like verbal immediacy also
influence recipients’ thoughts and feelings (e.g., Fiedler 2008; Fitzsimons and Kay 2004;
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Sela, Wheeler, and Sarial-Abi 2012). For example, providing a case explanation to jurors
written in the active (vs. passive) voice increases jurors’ perceptions of the actors’
responsibility and blame (Fausey and Boroditsky 2010; Henley, Miller, and Beazley
1995; Senay, Usak, and Prokop 2015). Similarly, messages that use more personal
pronouns increase the perceived association between managers and their messages,
leading to stronger recipient reactions to the news in those messages (Asay, Libby, and
Rennekamp 2014). Similarly, I expect that increased verbal immediacy will increase
recipients’ perceptions that a message is honest and credible.
Since markers of verbal immediacy are more common in informal rather than
formal settings such as business communications (Biber 1988; Mehrabian 1971; Weiner
and Mehrabian 1968), managers can likely benefit from increasing their immediacy under
certain circumstances. Specifically, I expect that highly immediate language in a
management forecast will eliminate the detrimental effects of a mismatch between
forecast roundness and forecast certainty, bringing investors’ willingness to invest nearer
to the higher level of willingness present when roundness and uncertainty match. This
prediction is depicted in Figure 2. Formally stated:
H2: When management forecasts use less immediate language, investors will be
relatively more (less) willing to invest when the level of forecast roundness
matches (mismatches) the level of forecast uncertainty. However, when
management forecasts use more immediate language, investors will be
relatively more willing to invest regardless of the level of forecast roundness
and forecast uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
3.1 Participants
537 MBA students participated in this experiment.1 529 (8) participated in
exchange for extra credit (without any incentive). 67 responses were excluded because
participants took the experiment a second time in another course, resulting in a final
sample of 470 responses. I use MBA students because they are good proxies for
reasonably informed investors (e.g., Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk 2007; Elliott,
Hobson, and Jackson 2011; Nelson and Rupar 2014; Tan, Wang, and Zhou 2014).
3.2 Experimental Instrument
Participants read case materials and evaluate a fictitious technology company as a
potential investment. I manipulate three independent variables using a 4x2x2 betweenparticipants experiment: forecast roundness (sharp-lower, sharp-higher, explicitly round,
and rounded), forecast uncertainty (higher, lower) and manager language (more
immediate, less immediate).
After providing informed consent, participants begin the task by reading
background information on NewTech, a publicly held, mid-sized technology company,
and review a 3-year summary of financial information. Participants then encounter the
first manipulation, which varies forecast uncertainty by changing the environmental
uncertainty surrounding the sales growth forecast. Specifically, when forecast uncertainty
is lower (higher), the company is releasing a new model of an existing product (a brand
new product), with historical sales information available for earlier models (with no
1

63.2% of participants are male. Using a 7-point scale, participants indicate how frequently they read
annual reports (mean = 3.28), read financial disclosures such as earnings announcements (mean = 3.50),
and invest in the stock market (mean = 3.71). Also on a 7-point scale, they indicate how comfortable they
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historical sales information available), making the new sales forecasts a little (very)
uncertain.
Participants then encounter management’s earnings guidance, which includes my
manipulations of both forecast roundness and language immediacy. I manipulate forecast
roundness by providing participants with management’s sales growth forecast for the
year. I manipulated the sales growth forecast instead of the EPS forecast because with the
EPS forecast, investors are likely to assume that the forecast is biased (regardless of
forecast roundness) simply because the company beat their benchmark. By manipulating
roundness of the underlying sales growth forecast, roundness/sharpness could potentially
(but does not necessarily) indicate bias. Thus my manipulation allows room for judgment
and for perceptions of roundness (sharpness) in-and-of itself to influence perceptions,
instead of the fact that the EPS forecast beat the benchmark overwhelming my
manipulation.2 The sales growth forecast is either a sharp number (i.e., 9.73% or 10.27%,
which are centered at 10.00%), an explicitly round number (i.e., 10.00%) or a rounded
number (i.e., 10%). I manipulate the sharp forecast with two different conditions, one
slightly higher than the round forecast and one slightly lower than the round forecast,
which allows me to compare sharp numbers to explicitly round and rounded numbers,
while holding the mean sales growth forecast constant.
Finally, I manipulate the immediacy of managers’ language in their forecast
explanation. Prior research indicates that verbal immediacy is one feature of language
captured by several linguistic components, which factor-analytically load onto one
construct (e.g., Pennebaker and King 1999). When language is more immediate the CEO
2

Merkley, Bamber, and Christensen (2013) find in their sample, that 29% of managers forecast one
supporting line item of their forecast. They also find that the most commonly disaggregated line item is
revenue with approximately 45% of press releases containing revenue forecasts.
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of the company uses the active voice, first person singular pronouns (e.g., “I”, “my”),
more discrepancy words (e.g., “should”), and fewer articles (e.g., “the”). When language
is less immediate the CEO of the company does not use any first person pronouns or
discrepancy words, but uses more articles and the passive voice (see Appendix A).
After reading the case materials participants indicate their willingness to invest in
NewTech’s stock, my primary dependent variable of interest, then respond to a series of
additional measured variables, attention checks, manipulation checks and demographic
questions.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
4.1 Attention and Manipulation Checks
I assess whether participants attended to the operationalization of forecast
uncertainty by asking: 1) whether ProChip is a new product or a new model, and 2) how
much historical data NewTech has to help estimate sales for ProChip. Eighty-two
participants answer one, or both, questions incorrectly or do not respond. Results do not
qualitatively change when these participants are excluded; therefore I included all
responses in data analysis. In addition, results indicate successful manipulation of
forecast uncertainty. Using a 7-point scale (1 = very uncertain; 7 = very certain)
participants in the lower (versus higher) uncertainty condition indicating that the sales
growth forecasting environment is more certain (3.73 vs. 2.97; F = 34.07; p < 0.001).3
Results also suggest that I was successful in manipulating verbal immediacy. Using
five reliable measures (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83), a MANOVA analysis indicates
participants in the more immediate language condition felt that the CEO took more
ownership over, was more directly involved in coming up with, more closely associated
himself with, was more personally responsible for, and had higher belief in, the forecast
(F = 4.91, p < 0.001).4
4.2 Hypothesis Testing
My first and primary dependent variable is participants’ willingness to invest (1 =
not very willing to invest; 7 = very willing to invest), but I also measure investment
attractiveness (1 = not at all attractive; 7 = very attractive). The two measures are highly
3
4

All reported p-values are one-tailed equivalent unless otherwise noted.
Participants responded using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
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correlated (Pearson Correlation = 0.84, p < 0.001; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91), so I also
create a composite measure (the average of willingness and attractiveness), representative
of investors’ judgments (hereafter referred to as “investors’ judgments”). Tables 1-3
present descriptive statistics for each dependent variable. In my analyses I focus on
willingness to invest because this more closely captures actual investment judgments,
which is the outcome of interest. I footnote where results differ across the three measures.
4.2.1 Tests of H1
H1 predicts a disordinal interaction such that willingness to invest depends upon
the match between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty (Figure 1). Specifically, I
expect investment willingness to be higher when forecast uncertainty is lower and
managers provide a more sharp (vs. more round) forecast and when forecast uncertainty
is higher and managers provide a more round (vs. more sharp) forecast. To test H1, I use
the sharp-higher and sharp-lower conditions (10.27% and 9.73%) to represent the “more
sharp” conditions5, and the rounded conditions (10%), which are both vague and
ambiguous, to represent the “more round” conditions (Figure 1). Furthermore, since H2
predicts the effects in H1 to be reduced with highly immediate language, I test H1 within
the less immediate language conditions.
I test H1 using a planned contrast which assigns weights of +1 to the conditions
for which H1 predicts higher willingness to invest (i.e., sharp forecast/lower forecast
uncertainty and rounded forecast/higher forecast uncertainty conditions) and -1 to the
conditions for which H1 predicts lower willingness to invest (i.e., sharp forecast/higher
forecast uncertainty and rounded forecast/lower forecast uncertainty conditions). Results
5

Investment willingness does no significantly differ between the two sharp conditions (10.27% mean =
4.18, 9.73% mean = 3.86; p = 0.119 two-tailed).
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appear in Figure 3 and in Table 4. Consistent with H1, Table 4, Panel B shows both a
significant planned contrast (F = 5.49; p = 0.010), and an insignificant residual betweencells variance test (F = 1.10, p = 0.606). These results support my prediction that
investors are more willing to invest when there is a match between managers’ forecast
roundness and the level of forecasting uncertainty.6
To further investigate this interaction effect, I follow up with tests of simple
effects (Table 4, Panel C). I find that when forecast uncertainty is lower, investors are
more willing to invest when the forecast is sharp (versus rounded) (F = 4.38; p = 0.019),
but when forecast uncertainty is higher, investors are more willing to invest when the
forecast is rounded (F = 3.17; p = 0.038). Thus investment willingness reverses
depending on the level of forecast uncertainty. In addition, for rounded forecasts,
investors are more willing to invest when forecast uncertainty is higher than lower (F =
7.05; p = 0.004), and for sharp forecast, investors are directionally more willing to invest
when forecast uncertainty is lower than higher, although this difference is not significant
(F = 1.00; p = 0.160). Overall, these results provide support for H1 and suggest that there
is a detrimental effect of a mismatch for rounded forecasts under lower uncertainty, but
not for sharp forecasts under higher uncertainty.
4.2.1.1 Tests of Investors’ Expectations
Next I provide evidence of investors’ expectations of forecast roundness given
forecast uncertainty. Using a 7-point scale (1 = I would expect a more round number
based on inexact estimates and calculations; 7 = I would expect a more precise number
based on exact estimates and calculations), participants respond to the following
6

Results for attractiveness are marginally significant (contrast test p = 0.081, residual between-cells
variance p = 0.452).
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question: “Given the level of certainty or uncertainty inherent in predicting sales for this
product, what type of sales growth forecast from NewTech would you expect as most
appropriate?”. Participants in the higher (versus lower) forecast uncertainty condition
indicate that they are more likely to expect round sales growth forecast (3.36 versus 3.93;
F = 12.378; p < 0.001). In addition, participants indicate how precise the forecast is
compared to their expectations (1 = less precise than I expected; 4 = about as precise as I
expected; 7 = more precise than I expected). As predicted, results indicate that
participants who received sharp forecasts under higher forecast uncertainty felt that the
forecast was more precise than expected (4.62 versus 4.00; t = 5.48; p < 0.001, twotailed) and participants who received rounded forecasts under lower forecast uncertainty
felt that the forecast was less precise than expected (3.32 versus 4.00; t = -2.49; p =
0.019, two-tailed). This supports the notion that forecast roundness and uncertainty can
be mismatched. Also as predicted, participants who received a rounded forecast under
higher uncertainty felt that the forecast was about as precise as expected (4.07; t = 0.30; p
= 0.769, two-tailed). Surprisingly, participants who received a sharp forecast under lower
forecast uncertainty felt the forecast was more precise than expected (5.07; t = 2.65;
0.010, two-tailed).7 Thus, sharp forecasts were always more precise than expected.
4.2.1.2 Tests of Credibility as Mediator of H1
To provide support that investors’ credibility assessments drive their willingness
to invest, I test for mediation. I create a factor score out of participants’ responses to three
questions, which assess their perceptions of the credibility, plausibility, and

7

I also measure how surprised participants were by the specificity of NewTech’s sales growth forecast,
given forecasting uncertainty (1 = not at all surprised; 7 = very surprised), and whether that surprise was
positive or negative (1 = positive; 4 = neutral; 7 = negative). The overall F-tests for both measures are not
significant.
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trustworthiness of the sales growth forecast (1 = not at all; 7 = very). The three measures
have a Cronbach’s alpha of .815, and all load onto a single factor using principle
components analysis. Results of the mediation analysis indicate that there is a significant
indirect effect of forecast roundness x forecast uncertainty on investors’ willingness to
invest through credibility (95% of bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect > 0.017).8
The residual between-cells variance test examining the first link of the mediation,
between the contrast weights and credibility, is also insignificant (F = 0.67; p = 0.616). I
also examine the 𝑟 ! as suggested by Guggenmos, Piercey, and Agoglia (2016).9 The 𝑟 !
between the credibility factor score and the contrast weights for H1 is 0.60. This indicates
that the between cells variance for the credibility factor score is only 60% explained by
the contrast weights. Overall this mediation indicates one way that forecast roundness
and forecast uncertainty influence willingness to invest is via credibility assessments.
4.2.2 Tests of RQ1
Recall that my research question asks whether, with respect to H1, explicitly
round forecasts (10.00%) will behave more similarly to rounded forecasts (10%) or my
predictions for sharp forecasts (9.73% and 10.27%). As with my tests of H1, all of my
analyses of RQ1 occur within the less immediate language conditions, since H2 suggests
that highly immediate language may eliminate the joint effects of forecast roundness and
forecast uncertainty.
8

The indirect effect is significant using only credibility or only plausibility as the mediator, (95% of
bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect > 0.013, > 0.006, respectively) but not using trustworthiness as
the mediator. I also measure perceptions of management’s competence as a mediator and find that the
indirect effect is not significant, suggesting that perceptions of management’s competence do not mediate
H1.
9

Guggenmos et al. (2016) explain that 𝑟 ! , which is the square of the correlation between the contrast
weights and the cell means, represents “the amount of variance explained by the contrast of interest as a
proportion of all between-cells (i.e. explained) variance” (p. 31).
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First, I examine the simple effect of uncertainty for precisely round forecasts and
find that investors are more willing to invest in a stock with an explicitly round forecast
when the environment is less uncertain than when it is more uncertain (4.25 vs. 3.59; F =
6.66; p = 0.011, two-tailed). This finding for explicitly round forecasts is inconsistent
with my findings for rounded forecasts and more consistent with my predictions for sharp
forecasts.
Next, I explore RQ1 by investigating whether the predicted interactive effect for
H1 (Figure 1) holds when comparing sharp forecasts versus explicitly round forecasts (as
the “more sharp” and “more round” forecasts, respectively, in Figure 1), or when
comparing explicitly round versus rounded forecasts (as the “more sharp” and “more
round” forecasts, respectively, in Figure 1).
Results of the sharp vs. explicitly round analyses appear in Figure 5 and in Table
5. As Figure 5 suggests, the predicted disordinal interaction for H1 is not supported for
the sharp versus explicitly round comparison. That is, for both explicitly round and sharp
forecasts participants have a directionally higher willingness to invest when forecast
uncertainty is lower, although this difference is only significant for explicitly round
forecasts (F = 3.59; p = 0.059, two-tailed). Table 5, Panel B shows the results of the
planned contrasts for H1, applied to the sharp vs. explicitly round comparison for RQ1.
As can been seen in Table 5, Panel B, results suggest that there is no significant
interaction between forecast uncertainty and roundness (F = 0.07; p = 0.797, two-tailed),
where forecast roundness examines (sharp and explicitly round forecasts). Supplementary
tests are generally consistent with this finding (Table 5, Panel C).
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Results of the explicitly round vs. rounded analyses appear in Figure 5 and in
Table 6. As Figure 5 suggests, results for the disordinal interaction predicted in H1 are
supported for the explicitly round vs. rounded comparison, as participants appear to react
to explicitly round forecasts reverse from rounded forecasts with respect to forecast
uncertainty. More specifically, Table 6, Panel B shows the results of the planned
contrasts for H1, applied to the sharp vs. explicitly round comparison. As can be seen in
Table 6, Panel B, the planned contrast for H1 provides support for a disordinal interaction
when applied to explicitly round vs. rounded forecasts for RQ1 (F = 10.37; p = 0.001,
two-tailed). Furthermore, the residual-between cells variance test for this contrast is
insignificant (F = 0.35; p = 0.769), indicating that the predicted interaction is what is
driving the significant contrast, not some other effect.
Simple effects for the explicitly round (e.g., 10.00%) versus rounded (e.g., 10%)
comparison are presented in Table 6, Panel C, and are generally similar to those for H1
(Table 6, Panel C). Specifically, investors appear more willing to invest in stocks with
rounded rather than explicitly round forecasts under higher forecast uncertainty (F = 7.45;
p = 0.007, two-tailed), but appear more willing to invest in stocks with explicitly round
rather than rounded forecasts under conditions of lower forecast uncertainty (F = 3.33; p
= 0.069, two-tailed). For explicitly round forecasts, investors are more willing to invest
when forecast uncertainty is lower, than higher (F = 3.59; p = 0.059, two-tailed).
However, for rounded forecasts, investors are more willing to invest when forecast
uncertainty is higher than when it is lower (F = 7.05; p = 0.004). Overall, these results
suggest investors’ react differently to explicitly round and rounded numbers. In
accordance with theory on vagueness and ambiguity, results across H1 and RQ1 suggest

25

investors’ reactions to rounded (versus sharp or explicitly round) numbers are likely
driven by their ambiguous presentation rather than by their explicitly presented
roundness.
Overall, investors may react to explicitly round forecasts differently from both
sharp and round forecasts with respect to forecast uncertainty. That is although
participants clearly react to explicitly round numbers reverse from rounded numbers with
respect to forecast uncertainty, they also do not react to sharp and explicitly round
forecasts in the same manner. There is no difference in participants’ willingness to invest
under higher and lower forecast uncertainty when forecasts are sharp, but participants are
more willing to invest in explicitly round forecasts when forecast uncertainty is lower
rather than higher. Thus participants treat explicitly round forecasts differently from both
rounded and sharp forecasts with respect to forecast uncertainty.
4.2.2.1 Tests of Credibility as Mediator of RQ1
I also examine whether credibility mediates the forecast roundness x forecast
uncertainty interaction when forecast roundness examines rounded (i.e., 10%) versus
explicitly round (i.e., 10.00%) forecasts (Figure 4). Although I conduct this mediation
analysis on the significant interaction found in RQ1, I use two-tailed tests because of the
exploratory nature of this research question and mediation. Results indicate that there is a
significant indirect effect of forecast roundness x forecast uncertainty on investors’
willingness to invest through the credibility factor score (95% of bootstrapped estimates
of the indirect effect fall between 0.023 and 0.270).10 The residual between-cells variance

10

The indirect effect is significant using only credibility or only trustworthiness, but not plausibility as the
mediator, (95% of bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect fall between 0.034 and 0.293; 0.022 and
0.253; -0.016 and 0.133, respectively). The indirect effect is also significant using management competence
as the mediator (95% of bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect fall between 0.019 and 0.270).
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test examining the first link of the mediation, between the contrast weights and
credibility, is also insignificant (F = 0.19; p = 0.830), and the 𝑟 ! between the means for
the credibility factor score and the contrast weights for H1 is 0.95 (Guggenmos et al.
2016). Suggesting that the contrast weights explain most of the variance in the credibility
factor score. Similar to mediation results for H1, results here indicate that forecast
roundness and forecast uncertainty influence investors’ willingness to invest through their
credibility assessments.
4.2.3 Tests of H2
H2 predicts that, when there is a mismatch between forecast roundness and
forecast uncertainty, more immediate language can elevate investors’ willingness to
invest nearer to the levels when there is no mismatch between forecast roundness and
forecast uncertainty (Figure 2). Figure 6 shows the contrast weights used to test this
specific three-way interaction.
Results of this test appear in Figure 7 and Table 7. Consistent with H2, Table 7,
Panel B shows both a significant planned contrast (F = 2.99; p = 0.043), and an
insignificant residual between-cells variance test (F = 1.01, p = 0.658).11 In addition, as
shown in Panel C, more immediate language increases investors’ willingness to invest
when there is a mismatch between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty for
rounded forecasts (F = 3.34; p = 0.034). Alternatively, recall that I did not find any
evidence that a mismatch between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty for sharp
forecasts caused reduced willingness to invest. Thus, I do not find evidence that more
immediate language increases (or decreases for that matter) willingness to invest for
11

Results are marginally significant for investors’ judgments (p = 0.070, residual between-cells variance p
= 0.624), but not significant for attractiveness (p = 0.167, residual between-cells variance p = 0.589).
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sharp forecasts under more uncertainty (F = 0.03; p = 0.436). Overall, these results
support my predicted three-way interaction and provide evidence that more immediate
language elevates participants’ willingness to invest when there is a detrimental effect of
a mismatch between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty.
4.2.3.1 Tests of Credibility as Mediator of H2
Next I test for mediation of the three-way interaction through credibility (using
the factor score). Results for this mediation analysis indicate that there is no significant
indirect effect on investors’ willingness to invest through credibility (95% of
bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect > -0.020).12 Similarly, I find no evidence of a
significant indirect effect through any of the measures of honestly or dishonesty, except
deceptive (95% of bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect fall between -0.039 and 0.001), which is significant in the wrong direction. Overall these results suggest that for
H2, the indirect effect does not operate via credibility, honesty or dishonesty.
4.3 Additional Analyses
Next I examine whether the predicted three-way interaction among forecast
roundness, forecast uncertainty and managers’ language holds when comparing sharp
forecasts (e.g., 10.27% and 9.73%) versus explicitly round forecasts (e.g., 10.00%) (as
the “more sharp” and “more round” forecasts, respectively, in Figure 1), or when
comparing explicitly round versus rounded forecasts (as the “more sharp” and “more
round” forecasts, respectively, in Figure 1). That is, I apply the contrasts used to test H2
to the above-mentioned comparisons.

12

The indirect effect is also not significant for the individual measures of credibility, plausibility,
trustworthiness or competence (95% of bootstrapped estimates of the indirect effect fall between -0.019 and
0.051; -0.015 and 0.037; -0.022 and 0.043; -0.038 and 0.021, respectively)
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Results of the sharp versus explicitly round analyses appear in Figure 8 and Table
8. As Figure 8 suggests, Table 8, Panel B, results show the predicted three-way
interaction proposed in H2 is not supported for the sharp versus explicitly round
comparison (F = 0.16, p = 0.684, two-tailed). Supplementary tests are generally
consistent with this finding (Table 8, Panel B).
Results of the explicitly round (e.g., 10.00%) versus rounded (e.g., 10%) analyses
appear in Figure 9 and in Table 9. Consistent with the three-way interaction predicted in
H2, Table 9, Panel B shows both a significant planned contrast (F = 9.14; p = 0.003, twotailed), and an insignificant residual between-cells variance test (F = 1.01, p = 0.642) for
the explicitly round versus rounded comparison. In addition, as shown in Panel C, more
immediate language increases investors’ willingness to invest when there is a mismatch
between forecast roundness and forecast certainty for rounded forecasts (F = 3.34; p =
0.034), but not for explicitly round forecasts (F = 0.17; p = 0.678, two-tailed). Overall,
these results suggest that the three-way interaction predicted in H2 replicates using
explicitly round and round numbers, but indicates that using more immediate language
does not reduce the detrimental effect of a mismatch between forecast roundness and
forecast uncertainty for explicitly round forecasts. Thus managers’ wishing to use
explicitly round forecasts should be careful to do so only under conditions of lower
forecast uncertainty.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Managers’ have discretion over the numerical roundness of their forecasts. In this
paper, I examine the different implications of sharp forecasts (e.g., 10.27% and 9.73%),
explicitly round forecasts (e.g., 10.00%) and rounded forecasts (e.g., 10%) on investors’
judgments. Prior archival research indicates investors rely less upon round than sharp
forecasts (Bamber et al. 2010; Dechow and You 2012), but does not distinguish between
explicitly round and rounded forecasts, and has little insight into situations which may
change this effect on investors’ judgments. I provide evidence that the positive effect of
sharp (versus rounded) forecasts on investors’ willingness to invest reverses under
conditions of higher environmental uncertainty. Furthermore I find that investors react to
explicitly round and rounded forecasts differently (i.e., 10.00% versus 10%), with
explicitly round forecasts leading to opposite reactions from rounded forecasts. Thus, my
results suggest that the ambiguous presentation of a rounded number (i.e., 10%) accounts
for the reverse effect on investors’ willingness to invest, rather than the explicit
roundness of the number. Overall, my results show how a change as seemingly innocuous
as rounding a sales forecast can alter investors’ perceptions of management credibility
and their willingness to invest.
To the extent that investors react negatively to a mismatch between forecast
roundness and forecast uncertainty, my results provide information to financial managers
about how to carefully construct earnings forecasts to limit these negative reactions. As
an example, my findings suggest conditions in which companies using a sharp underlying
sales forecast (e.g., 10.27%) to meet an earnings target can improve investors’
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perceptions by simply rounding the sales forecast disclosed (10%) while keeping the
underlying number sharp in their forecasted EPS calculations. Moreover, my findings
suggest other conditions in which companies rounding their sharp forecasts may
unnecessarily harm themselves in the eyes of investors. In addition, my findings suggest
that rounding even explicitly round numbers (i.e., rounding 10.00% to 10%) can either
improve or harm investors’ perceptions of a company, depending on the level of forecast
uncertainty. Thus, to the extent that rounding is viewed as an innocuous choice of the
financial reporter, companies should be aware that they can systematically affect
investors’ perceptions based on something as simple as rounding 9.73%, 10.27% or even
just 10.00% to 10%. To the extent that companies may make these rounding decisions
strategically, investors, standard setters, and other stakeholders should be aware of these
effects as well.
I also examine whether managers can alter their language to repair credibility
concerns resulting from a mismatch between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty.
My results indicate that more immediate language elevates participants’ willingness to
invest when there is a detrimental effect of a mismatch between forecast roundness and
forecast uncertainty, but only for rounded forecasts. Thus, managers who wish to issue
rounded forecasts can increase their verbal immediacy to overcome credibility concerns
resulting under an environment of lower uncertainty.
My study contributes to literature on the least understood component of
managers’ forecasts, their detailed characteristics (Hirst et al. 2008). While prior research
has considered how forecast disaggregation (Merkley et al. 2013; Hirst et al. 2007) and
point versus range forecasts (Rupar 2017; Han and Tan 2010; Han and Tan 2007; Hirst,
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Koonce, and Miller 1999) influence investors, I examine how variation within point
forecasts can influence investors’ judgments. My results complement the findings of
Bamber et al. (2010), and Dechow and You (2012) in providing evidence that managers’
point forecasts vary in the information they imply, and extend this literature by showing
conditions under which the advantages of sharp forecasts on investment willingness
reverse. Specifically, rounded (but not explicitly round) forecasts result in more
willingness to invest than sharp forecasts do under conditions of higher forecast
uncertainty.
My results may also be of interest to researchers who wish to further investigate
the impact of point versus range forecasts on investors’ judgments. That is, prior point
versus range research has used round points and round ranges (Han and Tan 2010; Hirst
et al. 1999), and sharp points and sharp ranges (Rupar 2017, Han and Tan 2007).
Researchers should carefully consider how forecast roundness and roundedness could
influence their results.
My study also contributes to the psychology and marketing literatures by
documenting how environmental uncertainty affects readers’ assessments of numerical
roundness. Although extant psychology and consumer marketing studies show that round
numbers are perceived to be inferior to sharp numbers on a host of qualities, relatively
little is known about potential moderators of this effect. I identify one such moderator:
environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, I identify credibility as an important mediator
this effect. Finally, like the accounting literature, the psychology and marketing literature
has not distinguished between explicitly round and rounded numbers, yet my study
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demonstrates that the two types of numbers have very different implications for investor
judgment.
Forecast roundness is an inherent feature of any qualitative forecast that has been
largely ignored in the accounting literature and as such there is ample opportunity for
future research in this area. As mentioned above, future research should consider how
roundness impacts perceptions of range forecasts in addition to point forecasts. While this
study addresses how roundness influences willingness to invest, future research can
investigate how roundness impacts investors’ reactions to a company missing or beating
forecast expectations. Finally, as the consumer psychology literature indicates that round
numbers influence perceptions of stability (Pena-Marin and Bhargave 2016), future
research should consider how round forecasts could help a company to increase
perceptions of stable performance.
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Figure 1

Willingness to Invest

Graph of Predictions for H1
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The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 2

Willingness to Invest

Graph of Predictions for H2
Panel A: Less Immediate Language

Lower Uncertainty
Higher Uncertainty

More Sharp

More Round

Willingness to Invest

Panel B: More Immediate Language

Lower Uncertainty
Higher Uncertainty

More Sharp

More Round

The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 3
Graph of Results for H1
5.00

Willingness to Invest

4.75
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Higher uncertainty
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3.25
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Sharp (9.73% & 10.27%)

Rounded (10%)

The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 4
Conceptual Model of Mediation for H1

Credibility

Forecast Roundness X
a
Forecast Uncertainty

b

Willingness to Invest

c

a

Forecast Roundness X Forecast Uncertainty is the contrast-weighted interaction
between forecast roundness and forecast uncertainty. The contrast weights used were [-1,
-1, +1, +1, +1, -1] for cells [A, B, C, D, E, F].
b

Credibility represents the credibility factor score composed of measures regarding the
credibility, plausibility and trustworthiness of the sales growth forecast (1 = not at all; 7 =
very).
c

The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 5
Graph of Results for RQ1
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Explicitly Round
(10.00%)

Rounded (10%)

The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 6
Graph of Contrast Weights to test H2
Panel A: Less Immediate Language

Willingness to Invest
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Panel B: More Immediate Language
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Higher certainty
Lower certainty

More Sharp
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The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 7
Graph of Results for H2
Panel A: Less Immediate Language
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Panel B: More Immediate Language
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The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 8
Graph of Results for Additional Analysis:
Sharp (e.g., 9.73% & 10.27%) vs. Explicitly Round (e.g., 10.00%) Forecasts
Panel A: Less Immediate Language
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Panel B: More Immediate Language
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3.50
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Sharp (9.73% & 10.27%)

Explicitly Round (10.00%)

The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 9
Graph of Results for Additional Analysis: Explicitly Round (e.g., 10.00%) vs.
Rounded (e.g., 10%) Forecasts
Panel A: Less Immediate Language
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Panel B: More Immediate Language
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The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following
question: "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints
(1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.
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Figure 10
Conceptual Model of Mediation for H2

b

Credibility

3-way Interaction

Willingness to
Invest

a

a

The 3-way interaction is the contrast weights used to test H2, consistent with those
shown in figure 6.
b

Credibility is the factor score composed of measures of the credibility, plausibility and
trustworthiness of the sales growth forecast (1 = not at all; 7 = very).
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Table 1
Willingness to Invest a - Descriptive Statistics
Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]

9.73%
Higher
uncertainty

Lower
uncertainty

44

Overall

a

Less immediate language
10.27%
10%
10.00%

Overall

9.73%

More immediate language
10.27%
10%
10.00%

Overall

Overall

3.97
(1.40)
31
A

3.93
(1.44)
28
B

4.50
(1.53)
30
C

3.52
(1.60)
29
D

3.98
(1.51)
118

3.80
(1.42)
30
E

4.18
(1.22)
28
F

4.10
(1.49)
30
G

3.67
(1.61)
30
H

3.93
(1.44)
118

3.96
(1.48)
236

3.96
(1.45)
27
I

4.45
(1.35)
29
J

3.54
(1.35)
28
K

4.19
(1.05)
31
L

4.04
(1.33)
115

3.73
(1.44)
30
M

4.03
(1.40)
30
N

4.20
(0.93)
30
O

4.31
(1.29)
29
P

4.07
(1.28)
119

4.06
(1.30)
234

3.97
(1.41)
58

4.19
(1.41)
57

4.03
(1.51)
58

3.87
(1.37)
60

4.01
(1.42)
233

3.77
(1.42)
60

4.10
(1.31)
58

4.15
(1.23)
60

3.98
(1.48)
59

4.00
(1.36)
237

The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participants response to the following question: "How willing are you to invest in
NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints (1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very willing to invest.

Table 2
Investment Attractiveness a - Descriptive Statistics
Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]

9.73%
Higher
uncertainty

Lower
uncertainty

45

Overall

a

Less immediate language
10.27%
10%
10.00%

Overall

9.73%

More immediate language
10.27%
10%
10.00%

Overall

Overall

4.20
(1.22)
30
A

4.14
(1.41)
28
B

4.60
(1.30)
30
C

3.79
(1.35)
29
D

4.19
(1.33)
117

3.73
(1.36)
30
E

4.07
(1.30)
28
F

4.20
(1.54)
30
G

3.63
(1.30)
30
H

3.91
(1.38)
118

4.05
(1.36)
235

3.81
(1.24)
27
I

4.34
(1.26)
29
J

3.57
(1.35)
28
K

4.23
(1.15)
31
L

4.00
(1.27)
115

4.00
(1.44)
30
M

4.27
(1.51)
30
N

4.13
(0.90)
30
O

4.21
(1.29)
29
P

4.15
(1.29)
119

4.08
(1.28)
234

4.02
(1.23)
57

4.25
(1.33)
57

4.10
(1.41)
58

4.02
(1.26)
60

4.09
(1.30)
232

3.87
(1.40)
60

4.17
(1.40)
58

4.17
(1.25)
60

3.92
(1.32)
59

4.03
(1.34)
237

The dependent variable, investment attractiveness is participants response to the following question: "Rate the company’s
attractiveness as a potential investment", on a scale with endpoints (1) Not very attractive and (7) Very attractive.

Table 3
Investors' Judgments a - Descriptive Statistics
Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]

9.73%
Higher
uncertainty

Lower
uncertainty

46

Overall

a

Less immediate language
10.27%
10%
10.00%

Overall

9.73%

More immediate language
10.27%
10%
10.00%

Overall

Overall

4.05
(1.23)
30
A

4.04
(1.38)
28
B

4.55
(1.30)
30
C

3.66
(1.40)
29
D

4.08
(1.35)
117

3.77
(1.33)
30
E

4.13
(1.23)
28
F

4.15
(1.49)
30
G

3.65
(1.38)
30
H

3.92
(1.36)
118

4.00
(1.36)
235

3.89
(1.27)
27
I

4.40
(1.25)
29
J

3.55
(1.30)
28
K

4.21
(1.06)
31
L

4.02
(1.25)
115

3.87
(1.40)
30
M

4.15
(1.43)
30
N

4.17
(0.83)
30
O

4.26
(1.24)
29
P

4.11
(1.24)
119

4.07
(1.24)
234

3.97
(1.24)
57

4.22
(1.32)
57

4.07
(1.38)
58

3.94
(1.26)
60

4.05
(1.30)
232

3.82
(1.36)
60

4.14
(1.33)
58

4.16
(1.20)
60

3.95
(1.34)
59

4.01
(1.31)
237

The dependent variable, investors' judgments is a composite measure calculated as the average to the following two questions:
participants response to the following question: 1) "How willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", and 2) "Rate the
company’s attractiveness as a potential investment". Both questions were asked on a scale from (1) Not very to (7) Very.

Table 4
Tests of H1: Willingness to Invest - Sharp (9.73% and 10.27%) vs. Rounded (10%) b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]

Higher uncertainty

Lower uncertainty

Less immediate language
9.73% 10.27% 10%
3.97
3.93
4.50
(1.40)
(1.44)
(1.53)
31.00
28.00
30.00
A
B
C
3.96
(1.45)
27.00
I

4.45
(1.35)
29.00
J

3.54
(1.35)
28.00
K

Panel B: Planned Contrast When Language is Less Immediate
Source
Sharp (9.73% and 10.27%) vs. Rounded (10%) x
c, d
Uncertainty)
[-1, -1, +1, +1, +1, -1] for [A, B, C, D, E, F]
Residual Variance

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

10.49

1

10.49

5.49

0.010

8.40

4

2.10

1.10

0.606

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

6.05

1

6.05

3.17

0.038

a

8.37

1

8.37

4.38

0.019

a

1.90

1

1.90

1.00

0.160

a

13.47

1

13.47

7.05

0.004

a

14.36

1

14.36

7.52

0.003

a

a

Panel C: Simple Effects Tests When Language is Less Immediate
Source
Effect of rounded vs. sharp for higher uncertainty
[C > (A+B)/2]
Effect of rounded vs. sharp for lower uncertainty
[K < (I+J)/2]
Effect of uncertainty for sharp forecasts
[(I+J)/2 > (A+B/2)]
Effect of uncertainty for rounded forecasts [K < C]
Effect of uncertainty for rounded forecasts vs. effect of
uncertainty for sharp forecasts
[C – K > ([A+B]/2) – (I+J])/2)]
a
b

c
d

Directional prediction, p-values are based on one-tailed tests
The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following question: "How willing
are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints (1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very
willing to invest.
Contrast used was [-1, -1, +1, +1, +1, -1], which is equivalent to conducting a [-1, +1, +1, -1] contrast, or using
the standard ANOVA weights.
Mean square error, and its degrees of freedom are based on the overall 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA, which is a more
conservative approach than using the MSE and DF from the smaller 3 x 2 ANOVA because the MSE is larger,
making it more likely that the residual between cells variance test will detect significance.
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Table 5
Tests of RQ1: Willingness to Invest - Sharp (9.73% and 10.27%) vs. Explicitly Round
(10.00%) b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]

Higher uncertainty

Lower uncertainty

Less immediate language
9.73% 10.27% 10.00%
3.97
3.93
3.52
(1.40)
(1.44)
(1.60)
31.00
28.00
29.00
A
B
D
3.96
(1.45)
27.00
I

4.45
(1.35)
29.00
J

4.19
(1.05)
31.00
L

Panel B: Planned Contrast When Language is Less Immediate
Source
Sharp (9.73% and 10.27%) vs. Explicitly Round (10.00%)
x Uncertainty c

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

0.13

1

0.13

0.07

0.797

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

3.61

1

3.61

1.89

0.170

0.00

1

0.00

0.00

0.969

1.90

1

1.90

1.00

0.160

6.85

1

6.85

3.59

0.059

1.73

1

1.73

0.90

0.342

[-1, -1, +1, +1, +1, -1] for [A, B, D, I, J, L]
Panel C: Simple Effects Tests When Language is Less Immediate
Source
Effect of explicitly round vs. sharp for higher uncertainty
[D vs. (A+B)/2)]
Effect of explicitly round vs. sharp for lower uncertainty
[L vs. (I+J)/2]
Effect of certainty for sharp forecasts
[(I+J)/2 vs. (A+B)/2)]
Effect of uncertainty for explicitly round forecasts [L vs.
D]
Effect of uncertainty for explicitly round forecasts vs.
effect of uncertainty for sharp forecasts
[D – L vs. ([A+B]/2) – (I+J])/2)]

a

a

Directional prediction, p-values are based on one-tailed tests, or equivalent

b

The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following question: "How willing
are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints (1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very
willing to invest.
Contrast used was [-1, -1, +1, +1, +1, -1], which is equivalent to conducting a [-1, +1, +1, -1] contrast, or using
the standard ANOVA weights.

c
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Table 6
Tests of RQ1: Willingness to Invest - Explicitly Round (10.00%) vs. Rounded (10%) b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]

Higher uncertainty

Lower uncertainty

Less immediate language
10%
10.00%
4.50
3.52
(1.53)
(1.60)
30.00
29.00
C
D
3.54
(1.35)
28.00
K

4.19
(1.05)
31.00
L

Panel B: Planned Contrast When Language is Less Immediate
Source
Explicitly round (10.00%) vs. Rounded (10%) x
Uncertainty c
[-1, +1, +1, -1] for [C, D, K, L]
Residual between-cells variance

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

19.82

1

19.82

10.37

0.001

1.32

2

0.07

0.35

0.769

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

14.24

1

14.24

7.45

0.007

6.37

1

6.37

3.33

0.069

6.85
13.47

1
1

6.85
13.47

3.59
7.05

0.059
a
0.004

19.82

1

19.82

10.37

0.001

Panel C: Simple Effects Tests When Language is Less Immediate

Source
Effect of rounded vs. explicitly round for higher
uncertainty [C vs. D]
Effect of rounded vs. explicitly round for lower
uncertainty [K vs. L]
Effect of uncertainty for explicitly round forecasts [L vs.
D]
Effect of uncertainty for rounded forecasts [K vs. C]
Effect of uncertainty for rounded forecasts vs. effect of
uncertainty for explicitly round forecasts [C – K vs. D –
L]
a

Directional prediction, p-values are based on one-tailed tests, or equivalent

b

The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following question: "How willing
are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints (1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very
willing to invest.
Mean square error, and its degrees of freedom are based on the overall 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA, which is a more
conservative approach than using the MSE and DF from the smaller 2 x 2 ANOVA because the MSE is larger,
making it more likely that the residual between cells variance test will detect significance.

c
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Table 7
Tests of H2: Willingness to Invest - Sharp (9.73% and 10.27%) vs. Rounded (10%) b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]

Higher uncertainty

Lower uncertainty

Less immediate language
9.73% 10.27%
10%
3.97
3.93
4.50
(1.40)
(1.44)
(1.53)
31.00
28.00
30.00
A
B
C

More immediate language
9.73%
10.27%
10%
3.80
4.18
4.10
(1.42)
(1.22)
(1.49)
30.00
28.00
30.00
E
F
G

3.96
(1.45)
27.00
I

3.73
(1.44)
30.00
M

4.03
(1.40)
30.00
N

4.20
(0.93)
30.00
O

4.45
(1.35)
29.00
J

3.54
(1.35)
28.00
K

Panel B: Planned Contrast
Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

5.71
19.23

1
10

5.71
1.92

2.99
1.01

0.043
0.658

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

6.39

1

6.39

3.34

0.034

a

Effect of language for sharp estimates, higher
uncertainty [(A+B)/2 > (E+F)/2]

0.49

1

0.49

0.03

0.436

a

Less Immediate Language:
Effect of uncertainty for rounded forecasts
vs. effect of uncertainty for sharp forecasts
[C – K > ([A+B]/2) – (I+J])/2)]

10.49

1

10.49

5.49

0.010

a

More Immediate Language:
Effect of uncertainty for rounded forecasts
vs. effect of uncertainty for sharp forecasts
[G – O > ([E+F]/2) – (M+N])/2)]

0.48

1

0.48

0.25

0.616

Source
Sharp (9.73% and 10.27%) vs. Rounded (10%) x
Uncertainty x Language Planned Contrast c, d
Residual between-cells variance

a

Panel C: Simple Effects Tests
Source
Effect of language for rounded estimates, lower
uncertainty [K > O]

a
b

c

d

Directional prediction, p-values are based on one-tailed tests, or equivalent
The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following question: "How
willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints (1) Not very willing to invest and
(7) Very willing to invest.
Mean square error, and its degrees of freedom are based on the overall 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA, which is a more
conservative approach than using the MSE and DF from the smaller 3 x 2 ANOVA because the MSE is
larger, making it more likely that the residual between cells variance test will detect significance.
See Figure 6 for weights by condition
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Table 8
Additional Analysis Three-way Interaction - Willingness to Invest: Sharp (9.73% and
10.27%) vs. Explicitly Round (10.00%) b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]

Higher uncertainty

Lower uncertainty

Less immediate language
9.73% 10.27%
10.00%
3.97
3.93
3.52
(1.40)
(1.44)
(1.60)
31.00
28.00
29.00
A
B
D

More immediate language
9.73%
10.27% 10.00%
3.80
4.18
3.67
(1.42)
(1.22)
(1.61)
30.00
28.00
30.00
E
F
H

3.96
(1.45)
27.00
I

3.73
(1.44)
30.00
M

4.03
(1.40)
30.00
N

4.31
(1.29)
29.00
P

4.45
(1.35)
29.00
J

4.19
(1.05)
31.00
L

Panel B: Planned Contrast
Source
Sharp (9.73% and 10.27%) vs. Explicitly Round
(10.00%) x Uncertainty x Language Planned
Contrast c, d

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

p - value

0.316

1

0.316

0.165

0.684

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

p - value

Panel C: Simple Effects Tests
Source
Effect of language for explicitly round estimates,
lower uncertainty [L > P]

a
b

c

d

0.20

1

0.20

0.11

0.744

Effect of language for sharp estimates, higher
uncertainty [(A+B)/2 > (E+F)/2]

0.49

1

0.49

0.03

0.436

Less Immediate Language:
Effect of uncertainty for explicitly round forecasts
vs. effect of uncertainty for sharp forecasts
[D – L > ([A+B]/2) – (I+J])/2)]

0.13

1

0.13

0.07

0.797

More Immediate Language:
Effect of uncertainty for explicitly round forecasts
vs. effect of uncertainty for sharp forecasts
[H – P > ([E+F]/2) – (M+N])/2)]

3.60

1

3.60

1.88

0.171

Directional prediction, p-values are based on one-tailed tests, or equivalent
The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following question: "How
willing are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints (1) Not very willing to invest and
(7) Very willing to invest.
Mean square error, and its degrees of freedom are based on the overall 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA, which is a more
conservative approach than using the MSE and DF from the smaller 3 x 2 ANOVA because the MSE is
larger, making it more likely that the residual between cells variance test will detect significance.
See Figure 6 for weights by condition
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Table 9
Additional Analysis Three-way Interaction - Willingness to Invest: Rounded (10%) vs.
Explicitly Round (10.00%) b
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]
Less immediate
More immediate
language
language
10%
10.00%
10%
10.00%
Higher uncertainty
4.50
3.52
4.10
3.67
(1.53)
(1.60)
(1.49)
(1.61)
30
29
30
30
C
D
G
H
Lower uncertainty

3.54
(1.35)
28
K

4.19
(1.05)
31
L

Panel B: Planned Contrast
Source

df

Mean
Square

Fstatistic

pvalue

17.47
11.60

1
6

17.47
1.93

9.14
1.01

0.003
0.642

Sums of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F - statistic

pvalue

Effect of language for explicitly round
estimates, higher uncertainty [L > P]

0.33

1.00

0.33

0.17

0.678

Effect of language for rounded estimates,
lower uncertainty [C > G]

6.39

1

6.39

3.34

0.034

Less Immediate Language:
Effect of uncertainty for explicitly round
forecasts vs. effect of uncertainty for rounded
forecasts [D – L > C – K]

19.82

1

19.82

10.37

0.001

More Immediate Language:
Effect of uncertainty for explicitly round
forecasts vs. effect of uncertainty for rounded
forecasts [H – P > G – O]

2.20

1

2.20

1.15

0.284

Panel C: Simple Effects Tests
Source

a

c

d

4.31
(1.29)
29
P

Sums of
Squares

Rounded (10%) vs. Explicitly Round (10.00%)
c, d
x Uncertainty x Language Planned Contrast
Residual between-cells variance

b

4.20
(0.93)
30
O

a

Directional prediction, p-values are based on one-tailed tests, or equivalent
The dependent variable, willingness to invest is participant's response to the following question: "How willing
are you to invest in NewTech's Stock?", on a scale with endpoints (1) Not very willing to invest and (7) Very
willing to invest.
Mean square error, and its degrees of freedom are based on the overall 4 x 2 x 2 ANOVA, which is a more
conservative approach than using the MSE and DF from the smaller 2 x 2 ANOVA because the MSE is larger,
making it more likely that the residual between cells variance test will detect significance.
See Figure 6 for weights by condition

52

APENDICES
APPENDIX A
LANGUAGE MANIPULATIONS
Less Immediate Language:
Jeff Smith, CEO of NewTech shared the 2017 earnings forecast today during NewTech’s
year-end earnings conference call, saying, “There is a positive outlook for NewTech in
2017. Due to the release of the new product ProChip, sales growth is expected to be
10.00% compared to 2016. Because of the 10.00% expected sales growth, the 2017
earnings per share is projected to beat last year’s EPS by $0.01 per share. Thus, thanks to
the 10.00% sales growth projection, EPS is expected to increase over the last year.”

More Immediate Language:
Jeff Smith, CEO of NewTech shared the 2017 earnings forecast today during NewTech’s
year-end earnings conference call, saying, “I have a positive outlook for NewTech in
2017. Due to the release of the new product ProChip, I expect sales growth to be 10.00%
compared to 2016. Because I expect 10.00% sales growth, I project 2017 earnings per
share should beat last year’s EPS by $0.01 per share. Thus, thanks to my 10.00% sales
growth projection, I expect EPS should increase over last year.”
*Underlined text indicates differences between the more and less immediate language
conditions – in the actual experiment none of the words in this manipulation were
underlined.
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APPENDIX B
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT
EXHIBIT 1
First Screen

54

EXHIBIT 2
First Screen Continued

55

EXHIBIT 3
Second Screen

56

EXHIBIT 4
Third Screen

57

EXHIBIT 5
Fourth Screen Higher Uncertainty Condition

58

EXHIBIT 6
Fourth Screen Higher Uncertainty Condition

59

EXHIBIT 7
Fifth Screen

60

EXHIBIT 8
Sixth Screen Less Immediate Language/Rounded (e.g., 10%) Condition

61

EXHIBIT 9
Sixth Screen More Immediate Language/Rounded (e.g., 10%) Condition

62

EXHIBIT 10
Sixth Screen Less Immediate Language/Sharp Higher (e.g., 10.27%) Condition

63

EXHIBIT 11
Sixth Screen More Immediate Language/Sharp Higher (e.g., 10.27%) Condition

64

EXHIBIT 12
Sixth Screen Less Immediate Language/Sharp Lower (e.g., 9.73%) Condition

65

EXHIBIT 13
Sixth Screen More Immediate Language/Sharp Lower (e.g., 9.73%) Condition

66

EXHIBIT 14
Sixth Screen Less Immediate Language/Exactly Round (e.g., 10.00%) Condition

67

EXHIBIT 15
Sixth Screen More Immediate Language/Explicitly Round (e.g., 10.00%) Condition

68

EXHIBIT 16
Seventh Screen Less Immediate Language/Rounded (e.g., 10%) Condition

69

EXHIBIT 17
Seventh Screen More Immediate Language/Rounded (e.g., 10%) Condition

70

EXHIBIT 18
Seventh Screen Less Immediate Language/Sharp Higher (e.g., 10.27%) Condition

71

EXHIBIT 19
Seventh Screen More Immediate Language/Sharp Higher (e.g., 10.27%) Condition

72

EXHIBIT 20
Seventh Screen Less Immediate Language/Sharp Lower (e.g., 9.73%) Condition

73

EXHIBIT 21
Seventh Screen More Immediate Language/Sharp Lower (e.g., 9.73%) Condition

74

EXHIBIT 22
Seventh Screen Less Immediate Language/Explicitly Round (e.g., 10.00%) Condition

75

EXHIBIT 23
Seventh Screen More Immediate Language/Explicitly Round (e.g., 10.00%) Condition

76

EXHIBIT 24
Seventh Screen Continued

77

EXHIBIT 25
Eighth Screen

78

EXHIBIT 26
Ninth Screen

79

EXHIBIT 27
Tenth Screen

80

EXHIBIT 28
Eleventh Screen

81

EXHIBIT 29
Twelfth Screen

82

EXHIBIT 30
Thirteenth Screen Rounded (e.g., 10%) Condition

83

EXHIBIT 31
Thirteenth Screen Sharp Higher (e.g., 10.27%) Condition

84

EXHIBIT 32
Thirteenth Screen Sharp Lower (e.g., 9.73%) Condition

85

EXHIBIT 33
Thirteenth Screen Explicitly Round (e.g., 10.00%) Condition

86

EXHIBIT 34
Fourteenth Screen

87

EXHIBIT 35
Fifteenth Screen

88

EXHIBIT 36
Sixteenth Screen

89

EXHIBIT 37
Seventeenth Screen

90

EXHIBIT 38
Eighteenth Screen

91

EXHIBIT 39
Nineteenth Screen Rounded (e.g., 10%) Condition

92

EXHIBIT 40
Nineteenth Screen Sharp Higher (e.g., 10.27%) Condition

93

EXHIBIT 41
Nineteenth Screen Sharp Lower (e.g., 9.73%) Condition

94

EXHIBIT 42
Nineteenth Screen Explicitly Round (e.g., 10.00%) Condition

95

EXHIBIT 43
Twentieth Screen

96

EXHIBIT 44
Twenty-First Screen

97

EXHIBIT 45
Twenty-Second Screen

98

EXHIBIT 46
Twenty-Third Screen

99

EXHIBIT 47
Twenty-Fourth Screen

100

EXHIBIT 48
Twenty-Fifth Screen

101

EXHIBIT 49
Twenty-Sixth Screen

102

EXHIBIT 50
Twenty-Seventh Screen

103

EXHIBIT 51
Twenty-Seventh Screen Continued

104

EXHIBIT 52
Twenty-Eighth Screen
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